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ARTICLE
Action sharpens sensory representations of
expected outcomes
Daniel Yon1, Sam J. Gilbert 2, Floris P. de Lange3 & Clare Press1
When we produce actions we predict their likely consequences. Dominant models of action
control suggest that these predictions are used to ‘cancel’ perceptual processing of expected
outcomes. However, normative Bayesian models of sensory cognition developed outside of
action propose that rather than being cancelled, expected sensory signals are represented
with greater ﬁdelity (sharpened). Here, we distinguished between these models in an fMRI
experiment where participants executed hand actions (index vs little ﬁnger movement) while
observing movements of an avatar hand. Consistent with the sharpening account, visual
representations of hand movements (index vs little ﬁnger) could be read out more accurately
when they were congruent with action and these decoding enhancements were accompanied
by suppressed activity in voxels tuned away from, not towards, the expected stimulus.
Therefore, inconsistent with dominant action control models, these data show that sensor-
imotor prediction sharpens expected sensory representations, facilitating veridical perception
of action outcomes.
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Action is the only means we have of inﬂuencing the worldaround us. It has been appreciated for over a century thateffective action depends on predicting its sensory con-
sequences1. We select actions based upon their predicted out-
comes2 and can use these predictions to generate rapid corrective
movements when we experience deviant sensory input3. Inﬂu-
ential models of action control developed in recent decades have
proposed that these predictions are used to suppress, or ‘cancel’,
perceptual processing of expected action outcomes. Namely, it is
assumed that a ‘forward model’ in the motor system suppresses
activity in expected sensory units4, which allows agents to ignore
predictable sensations and therefore remain maximally sensitive
to unexpected outcomes that may be important for learning or
planning new actions3,5. Such a cancellation mechanism may
provide an explanation for why it is difﬁcult to tickle oneself6 and
is thought to play a key role in generating our sense of agency and
explain its aberration in psychiatric illness7. The idea has drawn
wide support from neuroimaging studies that report predictable
tactile5,8 and visual9–11 consequences of action are associated
with reduced activity in sensory brain regions.
However, the core tenet of cancellation models—that sensory
processing of predicted action inputs is suppressed—contrasts
dramatically with predictive processing models developed in the
wider sensory cognition literature. Bayesian accounts of percep-
tion typically emphasise that in an inherently noisy sensory world
it is adaptive for observers to incorporate their prior expectations
into their sensory estimates12. Mechanistically, this incorporation
is implemented by altering the weights on sensory channels and
effectively ‘turning up the volume’ on expected relative to unex-
pected inputs13 (see Fig. 1). These ‘sharpening’ models are
thought to explain a range of perceptual phenomena whereby
observers are biased towards perceiving stimuli that they expect,
for instance, perceiving greyscale bananas to be yellow14. Under
these accounts it is hypothesised that activity in sensory brain
areas may in principle be suppressed for expected inputs15,16, but
the suppression would not resemble that predicted by the can-
cellation account. Speciﬁcally, activity should be suppressed only
in units tuned away from expected inputs, rather than in units
tuned towards these inputs as hypothesised by the cancellation
account. In line with this account, Kok et al17. found that visual
stimuli that were expected on the basis of a preceding tone evoked
weaker responses in primary visual cortex (V1) primarily in
voxels tuned away from the presented stimulus, and multivariate
pattern analysis (MVPA) demonstrated a superior ability to
decode the observed stimulus from activity patterns in this area.
Such ﬁndings suggest that weaker patterns of univariate activity
can reﬂect a ‘sharpening’ of neural populations toward expected
sensory events, rather than a suppression of expected signals.
To date, similar analysis techniques have not been applied to
sensory signals predicted by action. As such, it remains unclear
whether sensorimotor predictions act to suppress sensory activity
associated with expected action outcomes, as is widely assumed in
the action literature, or instead to sharpen such representations.
We adjudicated between these possibilities by requiring human
participants to execute hand actions (ﬁnger abductions) and
simultaneously observe congruent (same ﬁnger) or incongruent
(different ﬁnger) movements of an avatar hand, while recording
neural activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). This congruency manipulation exploits the fact that
congruent action outcomes are more expected than incongruent
ones, based either on inherited evolutionary expectations or our
extensive experience of controlling our own actions2. The atten-
tional relevance of observed movements was orthogonally
manipulated by alternating the participants’ task between blocks.
Under the cancellation account, suppression of units tuned to
the expected stimulus would reduce the amount of information
about observed hand movements, impairing classiﬁer perfor-
mance on congruent trials and generating reduced activation in
units tuned to the congruent stimulus (see Fig. 1). Conversely, if
prediction sharpens populations towards expected outcomes,
population responses will contain more information about
observed hand movements on congruent trials and there will be
reduced activation in units tuned away from the congruent sti-
mulus. We ﬁnd the latter pattern across early and late visual brain
areas, suggesting that the predictions we make on the basis of
action in fact sharpen sensory representations, facilitating ver-
idical perception of our actions in an inherently uncertain sensory
world.
Results
Manipulating expectations during action. Twenty healthy
human participants were instructed to abduct their index or little
ﬁnger on the basis of a shape cue (see Fig. 2a). An observed avatar
hand performed an abduction movement that was congruent or
incongruent with the participants’ own action and synchronous
with it. The attentional relevance of the avatar movements was
manipulated between blocks by requiring participants to judge a
property of the observed movement (ﬁnger-judgements; e.g., ‘Did
the INDEX ﬁnger move?’) or a coloured dot also presented on the
display (colour-judgements; e.g., ‘Was the dot BLUE?’). Analysis
of participant accuracies conﬁrmed that participants had little
difﬁculty in following task instructions (ﬁnger-judgement trials:
mean accuracy= 91.4 %, SEM= 0.022%; colour-judgement trials:
mean accuracy= 95.6%, SEM= 0.018%; see Methods for further
analysis of the behavioural data). There were also no move trials,
used to deﬁne regions of interest, where participants simply
observed the movements without performing actions.
Enhanced decoding of congruent observed actions. Linear
support vector machines (SVMs) classiﬁed the identity of the
observed action stimulus (index ﬁnger movement vs little ﬁnger
movement) from patterns of neural activity (see Fig. 2b).
‘Searchlight’ analyses18 yielded decoding maps for each partici-
pant. Decoding maps from no move trials were used to generate
data-driven regions of interest for subsequent analysis19. A
group-level t-test applied to these maps revealed three clusters
across occipital and temporal regions where stimulus identity
could be reliably decoded above chance (voxel-wise p < 0.001,
cluster-wise FWE p < 0.05;19,20): bilateral occipital cortex, left
occipital cortex and right occipitotemporal cortex.
To evaluate how predictions during action inﬂuence the quality
of underlying sensory representations, we separately extracted
decoding accuracies from these clusters for trials where the
observed outcome was congruent or incongruent with the
participant’s own action (see Fig. 3). Comparison of these
accuracies revealed an effect of congruency (F1,19= 4.781, p=
0.041, ηp2= 0.201) that did not change across clusters
(F2,38= 0.276, p= 0.760, ηp2= 0.014), and which reﬂected super-
ior decoding of stimulus identity on congruent trials relative to
incongruent trials. Contrary to cancellation models, this result is
consistent with the idea that prediction during action enhances
the quality of sensory representations associated with expected
outcomes.
To investigate possible interactions between effects of expecta-
tion and attentional relevance, we performed the same analysis
separating ﬁnger-judgement and colour-judgement trials.
This analysis found no interaction between congruency and task
(F1,19= 3.42, p= 0.08. ηp2= 0.153), but an interaction between
congruency, task and cluster (F2,38= 3.99, p= 0.027, ηp2= 0.174).
Post-hoc analyses found this effect to reﬂect an interaction
only in the right occipitotemporal cluster (F1,19= 8.122, p= 0.010.
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ηp2= 0.299; i.e., the smallest cluster), driven by stronger
congruent enhancements when stimuli were task irrelevant. The
congruency effect did not interact with task relevance in the
bilateral occipital (F1,19= 1.705, p= 0.207. ηp2= 0.082) or left
occipital clusters (F1,19= 0.023, p= 0.880. ηp2= 0.001), suggesting
that the attentional relevance of the stimuli did not mediate the
inﬂuence of expectation on sensory processing.
Suppression in units tuned away from expected stimuli.
Superior decoding of stimulus identity on congruent trials could
be achieved by relatively suppressing activity in units tuned away
from the expected stimulus, yielding sparser population codes
that are easier to distinguish with a pattern classiﬁer13,17.
To investigate this possibility we analysed stimulus-speciﬁc
patterns of univariate activity in each of the decoding clusters (see
Fig. 4). Using a t-test comparing activity for observed index and
little ﬁnger movements, we classiﬁed each voxel in a binary
fashion according to its preferred stimulus (t > 0= index-
preferred, t < 0= little-preferred). Analysis of the univariate
signal (beta values) revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between
congruency and stimulus preference (F1,19= 9.306, p= .007,
ηp2= .329) that did not vary across cluster (F2,38= 1.868, p=
0.168, ηp2= 0.089). This interaction was driven by weaker activity
on congruent relative to incongruent trials in voxels tuned away
from the current stimulus (t19= 2.214, p= 0.039), with no
congruency effect in voxels tuned towards it (t19= 1.099, p=
0.286). Therefore, in line with a sharpening account and
inconsistent with cancellation models, this pattern suggests that
suppression of sensory activity is found in voxels that are tuned
away from, rather than tuned to, currently expected action
outcomes.
Discussion
We tested for the ﬁrst time whether prediction during action
operates in line with normative Bayesian models of perceptual
processing, where it is widely assumed that predictive signals
‘sharpen’ expected sensory representations. Precisely as predicted
under this account, we demonstrated that visual events congruent
with concurrently performed actions were more readily decoded
from visual brain activity than incongruent events. Furthermore,
expectations were found to lead to suppressed activity in voxels
tuned away from the expected stimulus. These effects of expec-
tation generated on the basis of action are consistent with the
assumption that predictive message-passing is a ubiquitous fea-
ture of cortical function21.
Sharpening models propose that observers use their prior
knowledge about the likelihood of different events to optimise
perception in an uncertain world—biasing perceptual processing
towards expected events, which in turn aids the rapid construction
of (on average) more veridical percepts12. This sharpening is con-
sidered to arise through competitive interactions between neural
populations tuned towards and away from the expected stimulus,
such that activity in unpredicted units is attenuated relative to that
in predicted units (e.g., through lateral inhibition)13,17. Predictive
signals thereby stop ‘gossiping’ among sensory units21 (for further
discussion see ref.22). The competitive interaction process is likely
started by pre-activating populations tuned towards expected fea-
tures before a stimulus has been presented, given ﬁndings that early
visual regions represent a stimulus in anticipation of its presenta-
tion23. Such a pre-activation mechanism concords with classic
cognitive models of perception-action interactions, which assume
that preparation of an action requires activating representations of
its expected consequences2.
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Fig. 1 A schematic illustration of how predictive signals inﬂuence populations of sensory neurons under ‘cancellation’ and ‘sharpening’ models. Left:
Cancellation models developed in the action control literature propose that when we move (e.g., abduct our index ﬁnger) we generate a predictive signal
that suppresses activity in sensory units tuned to the expected action outcome (e.g., observation of an index ﬁnger movement)3, 4. Weakening the activity
in these units reduces the signal-to-noise ratio of the population response when stimuli are expected, leaving less information in patterns of neural activity
that could be detected by a pattern classiﬁer. Right: In contrast, sharpening models of prediction found in the wider sensory cognition literature suggest
that predictive signals suppress activity in units tuned away from expected stimuli13, 17. This leads to a sharper population response when stimuli are
expected, with a higher signal-to-noise ratio and making it easier to decode stimulus identity on these trials
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Such a mechanism explains why predicted events are more
readily detected24, faster to enter conscious awareness25 and
appear phenomenally more intense26. The evidence presented
here ﬁnds that prediction sharpens sensory processing of action
outcomes in a similar fashion, suggesting that the same percep-
tual beneﬁts may also be enjoyed in active settings. Such
sharpening during action is likely to be adaptive given that we are
also required to make sense of action outcomes in a noisy and
rapidly changing sensory world. For example, if attempting to
drink a cup of coffee in a dark kitchen before sunrise, we will
generate more veridical percepts of our ongoing actions if we
increase the weight on expected sensory channels (e.g., the sight
750 ms
+
+
+
500 ms
1000 ms
Train
Test
(i.e., index or little?)
OR
Did the index finger
move?
(Y/N)
Was the dot blue?
(Y/N)
a
b
Fig. 2 Action execution and observation task, with an illustration of pattern classiﬁcation. a During the experimental task participants performed actions
(e.g., index ﬁnger movement), which triggered movements of the avatar hand that were congruent (index ﬁnger) or incongruent (little ﬁnger) with their
actions and in synchrony with them. b A searchlight approach18 was used to decode the identity of observed actions based on BOLD activity from occipital
and temporal regions (shaded in green)
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of a moving hand). That percepts are generated rapidly is likely to
be of paramount importance in action settings, given that the
dynamic process of acting necessarily alters incoming sensory
input on a millisecond timescale.
These ﬁndings are hard to reconcile with cancellation models
from the action control literature, which suggest that activity in
expected sensory units is suppressed during action. These models
have implicitly assumed that prediction inﬂuences sensory pro-
cessing differently when predictions are based upon one’s own
actions. They emphasise how it is adaptive for agents to ignore
predictable sensations to remain maximally sensitive to unex-
pected outcomes that are more likely to be important for learning
or planning new actions3,5. Previous reports supporting these
models have inferred cancellation based on an attenuated uni-
variate signal for predictable action outcomes. Interestingly we
ﬁnd that univariate visual activity is lower when observed events
are congruent with action, as would be predicted under cancel-
lation models, but only in voxels tuned away from currently
expected action outcomes. It therefore appears likely that pre-
viously observed attenuations in visual9–11 and somatosensory5,8
areas reﬂect a dampening of responses in units tuned to unex-
pected stimuli, rather than the typically-assumed suppression in
expected sensory units, and hence may not reﬂect the operation
of a cancellation mechanism.
The cancellation model has retained a wide inﬂuence on
research in cognitive neuropsychiatry, particularly when
accounting for unusual beliefs about action and agency that arise
in clinical conditions like schizophrenia. For instance, the fact
that patients with delusions do not show neural signatures of
cancellation when tickling themselves27 has supported the idea
that delusions about action (e.g., that your movements are con-
trolled by an alien force) arise due to failures to suppress the
sensory consequences of action, making movements appear like
those that are externally generated7. If prediction during action
instead sharpens sensory processing, the mechanism underlying
these delusions may need revisiting. For example, if predictions
ordinarily sharpen perception, deﬁcits in prediction mechanisms
may lead to heightened uncertainty about the perceptual con-
sequences of our actions. This uncertainty may make us prone to
developing unusual beliefs about our movements and their cau-
ses. Such an account would be concordant with broader com-
putational models from neuropsychiatry which suggest that
delusions about a wide variety of phenomena arise because weak
sensory evidence is given undue weight when making inferences
about ourselves and the world around us28.
As well as adjudicating between cancellation and sharpening
models, this study presents a novel investigation of the relation-
ship between expectations evoked by action and top-down
attention, manipulated by task demands. Manipulations of
expectation (what is likely to occur) are often confounded with
top-down attentional demands (what is relevant for task perfor-
mance29), both in laboratory settings and natural environments.
Orthogonally manipulating these factors revealed that predictive
beneﬁts on decoding performance in bilateral and left occipital
cortices were independent of top-down attention, in line with
previous studies of expectation in other contexts17. However, an
interaction was found in our right occipitotemporal region, with a
stronger congruent enhancement when stimuli were irrelevant to
the participants’ task. This ﬁnding is not explicitly predicted by
either a sharpening or cancellation account, but it may suggest
that biases induced by expectation are sometimes larger for
unattended stimuli30. It is worth noting that these speciﬁc dis-
tinctions between top-down expectation and attention depend on
deﬁning these mechanisms based on contrasting kinds of top-
down knowledge (i.e., probability and task relevance). Opting to
deﬁne these processes differently (e.g., describing effects of task-
irrelevant probabilities as ‘attentional’) may render attention and
expectation empirically and conceptually indissociable. Never-
theless, the conclusive point that can be drawn from the present
ﬁndings is that sensory expectations sharpen sensory processing
largely independently of task relevance.
In conclusion, the data presented here have shown that pre-
diction during action sharpens sensory representations—visual
events congruent with concurrently performed action were more
readily decoded from visual brain activity, and expectations led to
suppressed activity in voxels tuned away from the expected sti-
mulus. Therefore, inconsistent with dominant action models,
these results suggest that sensory processing during action is
optimised in line with normative models of Bayesian perceptual
inference, facilitating veridical perception of action outcomes in
an inherently uncertain sensory world.
Methods
Participants. Twenty healthy human volunteers (13 female, 7 male; age range
19–28 years, mean age= 23.1 years) participated in the study. This sample size was
chosen to match a previous study that used the same multivariate decoding
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methodology in the context of a purely perceptual task and obtained robust effects
of expectation17. An additional three participants were tested but data were not
included in the ﬁnal sample either due to excessive movement during scanning
(one), premature termination of the experiment (one), or technical issues during
scanning (one). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
reported no current neurological or psychiatric illness. All participants provided
written informed consent prior to participation and were reimbursed £10/h. All
experimental procedures were reviewed and approved by the Birkbeck, University
of London and University College London Ethics Committees.
Procedure. Stimuli were displayed against a black background on a rear-projection
screen using a JVC DLA-SX21 projector (26 × 19.5 cm, 60 Hz). Observed hand
stimuli were generated in Poser 10 (Smith Micro Software) and consisted of a
gender-neutral right hand viewed from a canonical ﬁrst-person perspective (height
~ 13 degrees, width ~ 9 degrees, see Fig. 2). Participants lay supine in an MRI
scanner with both hands placed on MR-compatible button boxes. The right-hand
box was positioned across the midline of the participant’s body, such that the index
ﬁnger was above the little ﬁnger on the dorsal-ventral axis. Participants depressed
two buttons on the right-hand box with their index and little ﬁnger except when
executing movements. The left-hand button box was positioned below the right-
hand box on the participant’s left leg, and participants placed their left thumb
between two response keys.
Each trial began with the presentation of a white ﬁxation cross, which remained
present throughout stimulus presentation. After 750 ms, a neutral hand image was
presented behind the ﬁxation cross. On congruent and incongruent trials, this
neutral hand image was accompanied by a white shape (square or circle) indicating
which action (index or little abduction) the participant was required to perform.
The display remained on screen until participants executed the cued action,
measured by the release of the depressed key on the button box. Upon release of
the key, the neutral hand image was immediately replaced by an image of the
avatar hand abducting either its index or little ﬁnger. This sequence created
apparent motion of the observed ﬁnger that could be congruent or incongruent
with the participant’s own action, and that always appeared in synchrony with it.
Congruency therefore reﬂects relative expectation – congruent action outcomes are
more expected than incongruent ones, based either on inherited evolutionary
expectations or a prior lifetime of learning about what is likely2,5,8 (note that all
statements are therefore relative throughout the manuscript, and a congruent
suppression is equivalent to an incongruent facilitation). The movement of the
avatar hand also revealed a coloured dot (red or blue) in the previous ﬁngertip
location (see Fig.1). On no move trials, an imperative shape cue did not appear
with the neutral hand stimulus and the apparent motion sequence occurred after a
ﬁxed delay of 438 ms—matched to the average action execution reaction time in a
pilot experiment. A ﬁxed delay was implemented such that the onset of movement
had approximately comparable temporal predictability relative to the trials where
stimulus onset was yoked to the participant’s action. On all trials, the hand image
was removed after 500 ms and the screen was blanked for 1000 ms.
Participants completed one of two tasks, either making judgements about the
identity of the observed ﬁnger abduction (e.g., ‘Did the INDEX ﬁnger move?’—
ﬁnger-judgement trials) or the colour of the dot revealed by the ﬁnger movement
(e.g., ‘Was the dot BLUE?’—colour judgement trials). On each trial the question
was presented for 1500 ms, within which time participants were required to
indicate their response via a keypress with their left thumb. The next trial began
after a jittered inter-trial interval of 2–6 s.
The experiment was conducted in eight scanning sessions. Each session
comprised 48 trials. On two-thirds of these trials participants executed index or
little ﬁnger abductions with equal probability, and subsequently observed either
congruent or incongruent action outcomes with equal probability (16 each). The
remaining third of trials were no move trials (16), where participants observed
index or little abductions without moving themselves. The task was blocked within
each scanning session, such that one half of the session comprised ﬁnger-
judgement trials and the other colour judgement trials. The task alternated across
sessions, with the order counterbalanced across participants. At the beginning of
each block, participants were reminded of the task they were performing, as well as
the mapping between imperative shape cues and executed actions. This mapping
was counterbalanced across participants, and was also reversed halfway through
the experiment (i.e., the beginning of the ﬁfth scanning session) to remove any
confound between action-outcome congruency and cue-outcome congruency over
the experiment.
Before beginning the main experiment, participants completed two practice
blocks of 48 trials in a room outside the scanner. This practice block contained
identical ratios of each trial type.
Behavioural performance analysis. A congruency (congruent, incongruent) by
task (ﬁnger-judgement, colour-judgement) ANOVA on participant accuracies in
the tasks revealed that participants were signiﬁcantly more accurate when making
judgements about dot colour than ﬁnger identity (F1,17=40.656, p < 0.001, ηp2=
0.705). There was also an interaction between congruency and task (F1,17=11.130,
p= 0.004, ηp2= 0.396), reﬂecting superior accuracy on congruent trials relative
to incongruent trials when making judgements about ﬁnger stimuli (t17= 3.954,
p= 0.001), but no effect of congruency when making judgements about dot colour
(t17=−0.944, p= 0.358). This pattern resembles that obtained in previous studies
in the sensory cognition literature, where expectations facilitate behavioural per-
formance but only when they are task-relevant17. Due to a technical fault, choice
data could not be recovered for two participants on > 40% of trials, who were
excluded from the above analyses. Including the data available for these partici-
pants did not alter any statistical patterns observed.
fMRI acquisition and preprocessing. Images were acquired using a 3T Trio MRI
scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel head coil. Functional
images were acquired using an echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (ascending
slice acquisition, TR= 3.36 s, TE1/TE2= 30/30.25 ms, 48 slices, voxel resolution 3
mm isotropic). Structural images were acquired using a magnetisation-prepared
rapid gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (voxel resolution: 1 mm isotropic).
Images were preprocessed in SPM12. The ﬁrst six volumes of each participant’s
data in each scanning run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. All
functional images were spatially realigned to the ﬁrst image and temporally-
realigned to the 24th (middle) slice. The participant’s structural image was then
coregistered to the mean functional scan and segmented to estimate forward and
inverse deformation ﬁelds to transform data from participant’s native space into
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, and vice versa.
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Multivariate decoding analyses. MVPA analyses were implemented using the
TDT toolbox. In each analysis, a linear SVM was trained to discriminate which
stimulus (index or little) was observed on a given trial from patterns of BOLD
activity across voxels. The initial step in each analysis was the speciﬁcation of a
general linear model (GLM) in SPM12 including a separate regressor for each
stimulus type (e.g., observed index movement) in each experimental condition
(e.g., congruent trials) in each scanning run. All regressors were modelled to the
onset of the observed stimulus, movement parameters were included as nuisance
regressors, and all model regressors were convolved with the canonical haemo-
dynamic response function. This GLM generated eight beta images (one for each
scanning run) for each stimulus type (index or little) in each experimental con-
dition that were used for subsequent decoding analyses.
Separate SVMs were trained and tested on the 16 beta images (eight index and
little) in each experimental condition (congruent and incongruent), using a leave-
one-out cross-validation procedure. For each decoding step 14 images from seven
scanning runs were used to estimate a linear discriminant function separating
index and little movements, which was then applied to the remaining two beta
images to classify them as either index or little. This procedure resulted in eight
decoding steps, where each step reserved beta images from one of the eight
scanning runs for classiﬁer testing. The SVM’s accuracy was calculated as the
proportion of correctly classiﬁed images across all decoding steps.
Deﬁning regions of interest. All analyses used a ‘searchlight’ approach18, which
involved building a separate SVM for each voxel in the brain using the beta values
falling within a searchlight radius of 3 voxels (9 mm), and assigning the SVM’s
accuracy to the voxel upon which the searchlight was centred. This procedure
yielded decoding maps in participant’s native space indicating each voxel’s
decoding accuracy relative to chance level (50%; i.e., decoding accuracy of 60% is
treated as 10%). To allow comparison across participants, these decoding maps
were normalised into MNI space using the forward deformation ﬁelds estimated in
preprocessing and smoothed using a 4 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel in SPM12.
To maximise sensitivity, MVPA analyses were initially conducted collapsing
across ﬁnger judgement and colour judgement trials. Searchlight analyses from no
move trials were used to deﬁne regions of interest. Maps from each participant
were normalised and smoothed (described above), and subjected to a one-sample t-
test in SPM12, using cluster-wise inference to identify contiguous voxels where
decoding accuracy was signiﬁcantly above chance at the group level19. This
involves identifying individual voxels that passed a ‘height’ threshold (p < 0.001
uncorrected) and an ‘extent’ threshold applied to contiguous voxels that pass the
height threshold (FWE p < 0.0531,). This combination of thresholds has been
shown to control appropriately for false-positive rates20. We restricted this contrast
to occipital and temporal areas using the SPM12 atlas, to limit analyses to regions
putatively involved in different aspects of visual processing32, and analyses were
not constrained to clusters of a minimum size. This analysis revealed three clusters
in bilateral occipital cortex (bOC, 1825 voxels), left occipital cortex (lOC, 703
voxels) and right occipitotemporal cortex (rOTC, 374 voxels, see Fig. 2). Note that
these speciﬁc ROIs may not generalise beyond the participants that we scanned.
This is because one-sample t-tests on decoding measures do not support
population inference, given that below-chance decoding accuracies are not
meaningful33. However, the analyses used below to test our hypotheses investigate
the difference in decoding accuracy between two conditions, rather than comparing
against chance performance and so do support population inference. It is also
worth noting that similar ﬁndings were obtained if deﬁning the ROIs according to
a permutation test approach33 (see Supplementary Note 1).
Effects of expectation on stimulus decoding. To investigate effects of expectation
during action on decoding accuracy, we extracted and averaged the decoding
accuracies within each cluster separately for congruent and incongruent trials.
These mean accuracies were then subjected to a cluster (bOC, lOC, rOTC) by
congruency (congruent, incongruent) ANOVA.
To investigate possible interactions between expectations during action and
top-down attentional relevance29, additional searchlights were conducted
separately for each combination of congruency (congruent, incongruent) and task
(ﬁnger judgement, colour judgement). This procedure was identical to that
described above, though segregating stimulus events halved the number of stimulus
events used to model beta images for decoding. Mean decoding accuracies for each
participant were calculated for each condition in each cluster, and these values were
analysed using a cluster (bOC, lOC, rOTC) by congruency (congruent,
incongruent) by task (ﬁnger judgements, colour judgements) ANOVA.
Effects of expectation on stimulus-speciﬁc activity. We investigated how
expectations during action change the proﬁle of activity across sensory populations
by examining how stimulus-speciﬁc patterns of univariate BOLD activity varied
between congruent and incongruent trials, within the same regions of interest.
Using the same unnormalised, unsmoothed images used for multivariate decoding,
we conducted a t-contrast in SPM12 for each participant comparing activity for
observed index ﬁnger stimuli and observed little ﬁnger stimuli across all conditions.
This contrast yielded a t-map for each participant where positive and negative
values reﬂected a voxel’s preference for either index or little ﬁnger stimuli,
respectively.
After assigning a preferred stimulus to each voxel, we extracted univariate
BOLD signal (beta values) from each voxel separately for congruent and
incongruent trials as a function of whether the stimulus was the preferred or non-
preferred stimulus for a given voxel. For example, if a voxel was classiﬁed as ‘index
preferring’, the univariate signal on congruent trials where an index ﬁnger was
presented was congruent-preferred, whereas signal on the same trials was
congruent-non-preferred for voxels classiﬁed as ‘little preferring’. Univariate BOLD
signal was extracted from each voxel in each of the clusters used for decoding and
analysed with a cluster (bOC, lOC, rOTC) by congruency (congruent, incongruent)
by preference (preferred stimulus, non-preferred stimulus) ANOVA. Analyses
examining univariate main effects of congruency are reported in the
Supplementary Information (see Supplementary Note 2).
Statistical information. Regions of interest were identiﬁed using cluster-wise
inference on group-level decoding maps, with a combined primary voxel threshold
(p < .001 uncorrected) and cluster-deﬁning threshold (FWE p < .05) that appro-
priately controls false-positive rates20. For alternative information prevalence
analyses, see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Fig. 1. All inferential
statistics evaluating differences between experimental conditions used an alpha
level of 0.05. Assumptions of parametric tests were met. All error bars show 95%
within-participant conﬁdence intervals of the mean difference between
conditions34.
Data availability
All relevant data will be made available by the authors upon request.
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